07 October 2013

ARTICLE: Friedman on Law and the Modern Condition

Lawrence Friedman, ‘Introduction’Free Download to Friedman (ed) Law and the Modern Condition: Literary and Historical Perspectives (2013)


Using fiction as a lens through which to view particular developments in the law, each of the essays in the new book, 'Law and the Modern Condition: Literary and Historical Perspectives' (Talbot Publishing, 2013), discusses a work of literary fiction — some classical (the tale of Ruth in the Bible, the fiction of Franz Kafka and Herman Melville, the plays of William Shakespeare) some modern (the post-September 11 fiction of William Gibson, Ken Kalfus, Claire Messud, Ian McEwan and Helen Schulman) — that concerns, directly or indirectly, the historical development of the law. This exploration of legal history through fiction pays particular attention to its relevance to our present circumstances and our growing concerns about terrorism and civil liberties. Each essay considers the legal lessons about the fictional event or events at its core, lessons that tell us something worth remembering as we continue to chart law’s evolution. These lessons, like those that may be found in all great literature, necessarily extend beyond the historical confines of the characters and plot and background of each story to embrace the modern condition — which, as these great stories suggest, is and always has been the only condition.

BOOK: Sankari on European Court of Justice Legal Reasoning in Context


The task of the European Court of Justice is to ensure that the law is observed in interpreting and applying the Treaties. This duty is carried out in a transnational constitutional environment where interpretation and application are to a large extent divorced from each other. An array of approaches to assessing the Court’s work already exists. The distinct underlying assumptions of each perspective affect how Court practice is interpreted and evaluated. In terms of legal interpretation, at the one extreme would be those who subscribe to a historical-originalist – or conserving – approach and at the other those subscribing to an uncritically teleological or dynamic approach premised on furthering integration. Neither extreme necessarily reflects in either descriptive or normative terms a fair or realistic understanding of the Court, its work, and the outcomes of legal interpretation. 

Even if in reality the differences were more a matter of degree, developing a better balanced approach is useful.

The approach advocated here is called Court of Justice legal reasoning. The approach is critical towards offering generalisations concerning the Court’s work based on purposively chosen case-law, downplaying the role of law in not only facilitating but also restraining the Court’s choices, and overemphasising teleology or integration as pre-designated and permanent explanatory factors of legal evolution. The Court of Justice legal reasoning approach is firmly anchored to actual case-law analysis, instead of abstract legal theory, which ensures it does not become wholly disconnected from the everyday of courts. Moreover, the approach takes into account how the Court keeps applying its relatively conventional self-assumed criteria of legal interpretation, considers interpretations offered in preliminary rulings in their systemic and factual context, and generally views the Court as the constitutional court of a legal order. F inally, the approach builds on sincerely listening to the Court: considering the meaning of silences in reasoning, ways of restrictive interpretation, and the distinction between singular cases and lines of cases in defining the degree of universality of interpretations included in them. The aim is to further the understanding of scholars and practitioners in terms of how legal interpretations pronounced, especially in preliminary rulings, both have been and could be interpreted by their legal audience.

BLOG: Custom Now (from the Legal History Blog)

From the Legal History Blog:

Custom Now: A Symposium

Posted by 

I've recently learned of an interesting symposium on custom published in volume 48 of the Texas International Law Journal, which is  available on line:

Introduction, by Emily Kadens

In the Name of Custom, Culture, and the Constitution: Korean Customary Law in Flux, by Marie Seong-Hak Kim

Legal Autonomy Versus Regulatory Law: Customary Law in Eastern Scandinavia, by Kjell Å. Modéer

Western Scandinavia: Exit “Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch” — The Resurrection of Customary Laws, by Peter Ørebech

False Jurisdictions? A Revisionist Take on Customary (Religious) Law in Germany, by Pascale Fournier & Pascal McDougall

The Law and Economics of Norms, by Juliet P. Kostritsky

Custom in American Property Law: A Vanishing Act, by Henry E. Smith

The Jurisprudence of Custom, by Frederick Schauer 

BOOKS: Political and Legal Transformations of an Indonesian Polity and Religion in Disputes

The Commission on Legal Pluralism has recently circulated the following:
RECENT PUBLICATIONS IN LEGAL PLURALISM
1. Political and Legal Transformations of an Indonesian Polity: The Nagari from Colonisation to Decentralisation, by Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Cambridge University Press.
Political and Legal Transformations of an Indonesian Polity is a long-term study of the historical transformations of the Minangkabau polity of nagari, property relations and the ever-changing dynamic relationships between Minangkabau matrilineal adat law, Islamic law and state law. While the focus is on the period since the fall of President Suharto in 1998, the book charts a long history of political and legal transformations before and after Indonesia's independence, in which the continuities are as notable as the changes. It also throws light on the transnational processes through which legal and political ideas spread and acquire new meanings. The multi-temporal historical approach adopted is also relevant to the more general discussions of the relationship between anthropology and history, the creation of customary law, identity construction, and the anthropology of colonialism.

More information: www . cambridge . org/9781107038592.

2. 
Religion in Disputes: Pervasiveness of Religious Normativity in Disputing Processes, by Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Martin Ramstedt, and Bertram Turner (eds.), Palgrave McMillan.

Religion manifests itself in an array of disputes in different geographical context. Here, the contributors examine such questions through case studies from Europe, the United States, Israel, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. The conficts range from those involving religious authorities to disputes in non-religious contexts in which actors invoke religious rhethoric and repertoires in settings that at first sight have nothing to do with classical disputing processes. The analyses are grounded in extensive ethnographical and historiographical research and show how different dimensions of the religious may enter into, transform, affect and be affected by the course an outcome of dispute processes at different moments of their unfolding.

More information: www . palgrave . com.

JOURNAL: Speical Issue of the International Journal of Discrimination and the Law

CoverInternational Journal of Discrimination and the Law

Special Thematic Issue: Reasonable accommodation of religious claims in workplaces? Basic tensions, socio-legal debates, and (quasi-)judicial decisions in six European countries

Guest editors: Katayoun Alidadi, Veit Bader and Floris Vermeulen

ARTICLE: Svensson on Norms in Law and Society



Måns Svensson's '

Norms in Law and Society: Towards a Definition of the Socio-Legal Concept of Norms', to be included in M Baier (ed), Social and Legal Norms. (2013), is not on SSRN: 

In this paper, I have argued that the norm concept is central to Sociology of Law and could be held to be equally important as, say, the concept of attitude to Social Psychology. It will probably never be possible to fully bridge the classic gulf between the two dominating academic perspectives on Law – namely, Sociology and Legal Science. However, the norm concept, defined via the essential attributes, tells us that all norms (legal and other social norms) have three properties in common: they are imperatives (‘ought’), yet social facts (‘is’), and, in the end, always subjective beliefs.

JOURNAL: (2013) 16:3 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal

(2013) 16:3 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal (PER)  is now freely available here.

For previous issues of PER, please go to http://www.nwu.ac.za/p-per/volumes.html
PER publishes contributions in English, Afrikaans, Dutch and German and all contributions are blindly peer reviewed.

Please send all contributions electronically to the editor, Christa Rautenbach, at christa.rautenbach@nwu.ac.za. The style requirements of PER can be found at http://www.nwu.ac.za/content/style.

Please don’t hesitate to contact us by e-mail if you have any questions. We look forward to hearing from you.

ARTICLE: Choudhury on Law, Gender, and the Burden of Culture

Cyra Akila Choudhury has posted 'Law, Gender, and the Burden of Culture' on SSRN:


This essay makes three points about the use of culture as an argument against law reform and as an explanation for why reform does not happen. First, culture (and its religious analog) is often used as a justification for avoiding gender law reform. However, what is often hidden behind such usage is a highly particular and discreet set of political choice about how to arrange the rights and obligations within society. These choices are not determined a priori by a cultural script. Second, both those who tend to use it to justify doing nothing or doing very limited reforms as well as those who seek sweeping reforms view culture similarly. This mirroring of relativists and universalists is an old construction that has roots in the colonial period and this history is important in understand the present dilemmas of feminism. Finally, that mirroring dynamic also reflects a seemingly intractable oppositional tension between multi-culturalist/relativists who seek to preserve culture and the universalists who seek to overcome it. This tension is very present in legal feminist thought and activism making transnational coalitions and support more complicated. While it is impossible to fully explore that tension as it manifests in the literature or its damaging effects on feminist activism and agenda-setting, I do want to examine two contexts in which it can be clearly observed: the veil context in France and the recent activism by Femen to “free” Muslim women from Islam. By grounding the theoretical observations in these two practical phenomena, I hope to show that unless the impasse is overcome, the full potential of emancipatory feminist thought and activism will never be realized. 

BOOK: Banakar and Tavers on Law and Social Theory

Law and Social Theory (2nd Edition)
Edited by Reza Banakar and Max Travers

There is a growing interest within law schools in the intersections between law and different areas of social theory. The second edition of this popular text introduces a wide range of traditions in sociology and the humanities that offer provocative, contextual views on law and legal institutions.

The book is organised into six sections, each with an introduction by the editors, on classical sociology of law, systems theory, critical approaches, law in action, postmodernism, and law in global society. Each chapter is written by a specialist who reviews the literature, and discusses how the approach can be used in researching different topics. New chapters include authoritative reviews of actor network theory, new legal realism, critical race theory, post-colonial theories of law, and the sociology of the legal profession. Over half the chapters are new, and the rest are revised in order to include discussion of recent literature. 

02 October 2013

OPINION: Fictions and Fecklessness (On the Proposed Abolition of the Upper House of Parliament in the Republic of Ireland)

NOTE: The following paper relates to the current debate in the Republic of Ireland about whether or not to abolish its upper house of parliament (the Seanad). I include it here both because I believe that it might be of interest to many of you and because the referendum occurs this Friday and I wanted to make the text available. This version is the latest of those I've delivered at public debates on the subject. My more extended treatment of the subject is available here and here. For more information on the referendum, see here. - SPD


FICTIONS AND FECKLESSNESS
Dr Seán Patrick Donlan

I’m not a party political man, but I’m a democrat to the bone. The Seanad is an irredeemable institution and an insult to the principles of our republic. Its failings include:

  • Its thinly-disguised partisanship, under the fiction of vocationalism
  • Its explicit elitism, including special representation for specific classes
  • Its political cronyism, the power it provides for political patronage
  • Its distant, attenuated democracy; this referendum is more genuinely democratic than any Seanad election

The fact that the Seanad is also unnecessary and unfit for purpose is only more damning.

For a more egalitarian republic and a more direct democracy, the Seanad should be abolished so that we can turn to more important matters, not least real reform of the Dáil, our democratic chamber. But abolition is no mere sideshow and serious parliamentary reform is dependent on sorting out its place in our constitutional order.

In short, the Seanad’s flaws are too fundamental to be fixed. We might tinker with its vocationalism, elitism, or patronage, though few on the NO side are committed to even these modest changes. But the Seanad is also redundant and even anti-democratic.  To meaningfully widen its electorate would duplicate the Dáil’s popular mandate. The result could be gridlock and conflict between the houses over which chamber actually represents the people. And broadening the Seanad’s brief can only occur at the expense of our democratic chamber. They’d hardly agree to this. Nor should they.

Along with a majority of the people, both Government and opposition parties support abolition: Fine Gael, Labour, Sinn Féin, and the Socialist Party. Not surprisingly, Fianna Fáil, the coalition’s perennial opponent, opposes them. In fact, except for Senators desperate to save their cushy seats, only other ghosts of Governments past are allies (ie, the Green Party and the PDs). Indeed, it’s no coincidence that those most sceptical of a more direct democracy, and of the Dáil itself, are those most recently denied parliamentary power by the people. No wonder they don’t trust them.

And, to my deep disappointment, there are also well-meaning fellow progressives who want to hold onto the Seanad to advance their politics without the hard and messy work of real democracy. This odd alliance is at once patronising towards the people and cynical in their campaign and condescending towards the people and defeatist about our ability to govern without the minders of the Seanad. In short, they don’t trust us or our democratic representatives.

In the NO crowd’s campaign of misinformation, they’ve spared no effort in whipping up paranoia about abolition, madly dashing everywhere to shout that ‘the sky is falling, the sky is falling’.

I’m not suggesting that the YES side is snowy white. It isn’t. The cost and number of our parliamentarians, the public focus of the Government campaign, is irrelevant. Our citizens would pay for good government. The coalition ought to have done better and acted more honourably.

But even today, the NO side has made vulgar comparisons between our Government and communism and fascism, between our Taoiseach and Kim Jong-un or Mussolini. And ‘Democracy Matters’, the leading group on the NO side, whose name is worthy of the doublethink of George Orwell’s 1984, suggests that a people’s free vote on the content of their Constitution is the equivalent of trampling on that document. This isn’t to be taken seriously. The amendment won’t bring constitutional crisis or autocracy or asteroids or plague or the end of days. It’ll hardly be noticed.

For example, the Seanad has never been a check on anyone. It was never meant to be and it should not be. The President, the courts, and general elections are our constitutional checks against legislative power. Most constitutional changes related to the referendum are mere editing. The NO side’s scaremongering about Articles 27 and 29 is spurious.

Similarly, the belief that our whip system is too strong, and it is, has nothing to do with the Seanad. The whip is a political, not a constitutional, matter. Insofar as it can be changed, only Dáil reform is relevant. If anything, abolition will remove a Taoiseach’s power to reward cronies with cushy jobs in Senate seats. And there will be higher thresholds for impeachments of judges and the President. Those are real, practical checks on the Government.

And the Seanad is unnecessary. One house of parliament works well throughout the world for states like ours. With minor alterations, unicameralism provides the heightened scrutiny and deliberation in law-making that we desire. And it would do so with a single mandate from the people through our genuinely democratic general elections. There’d be no tug-of-war between chambers.

We have bicameralism because the British did and because the Seanad once provided a safe haven for southern unionists. Bicameralism is largely a holdover from a feudal past. It isn’t made for democracy and in a modern state like ours, it muddies the popular will, it doesn’t protect it. We have bicameralism only because we’ve always had it. Its roots are

  • pre-modern aristocracies and elitism,
  • colonial copying around the world,
  • inertia and fear of change, and, as here,
  • ‘jobs for the boys’

Bicameralism can make sense where it’s used to represent distinct territorial units or cultural groups. But as a small, unitary republic, there’s no reason for it here.

But the biggest lie of the NO side is as much their self-deception as their con. Not only is reform not on the ballot, but there has never been, and there is not now, any consensus on reform. At least four different polls have confirmed this in the last month, including one today. Those supporting reform make up 29% of the population, only two points above the number of undecided in this referendum; a mere 36% of those intending to vote. And those numbers have to be divided between at least six reform schemes, the largest two of which are fundamentally contradictory.

And we should be very grateful because the NO side want to solve the real problems of our republic with gimmicks and fantasy, even though that’s how we bungled the creation of the Seanad back in the 1930s. This is exciting perhaps, but the stuff of daydream and, with respect, the thought questions of undergraduate exams. In addition, the best-known schemes of current Senators and their patrician allies, still perpetuate the fiction of vocationalism, the elitism of university set-asides, and political patronage. They’re barely reforms at all. There most novel in their attempt to give special representation for special interests, but this neo-vocationalism has succeeded nowhere.

Ironically, the most radical scheme is that of Fianna Fáil itself, though no one is talking about it. This is true because it’s unworkable and because it conflicts fundamentally with the pet schemes of their own allies. But it hardly matters. There’s no reform consensus and not a word of it will become law. And I say this with optimism, the realism of a democrat who wants a more egalitarian republic and a more direct democracy than any of the so-called reforms provide for.

In conclusion, the Seanad must be abolished. It’s elitist, undemocratic, and wholly unnecessary. It shouldn’t be tolerated in a republic.

But it’s important to remember that abolition takes effect after the next general election. Government reforms already proposed, on Dáil committees and gender quotas, have real practical, potential. But like others, I believe that more can and should be done. It’ll be in the interest of the coalition, in the aftermath of a YES result, to show itself to be serious about Dáil reform.

And there’s so much potential for this, rooted not in speculative schemes, but in established political science. I hope, in future, to work alongside those who are now my opponents in this debate, to ensure meaningful Dáil reform. To hold the coalition’s feet to the fire. And if this coalition, or future Governments of any political persuasion, fails to deliver, we can always dump them, as we did, belatedly perhaps, with the last Government. That’s as it should be. That’s the ‘terrible beauty’ of democracy.

Our republic doesn’t need Seanad minders, but a more active and engaged citizenry. We need a more direct, unicameral democracy—not buck-passing bicameralism—to pressure our public representatives to do our bidding. Oversight of our politicians is our responsibility as citizens. And, unlike the NO side, I have faith that the Irish people can do this.


Don’t be conned. A NO result is a vote for the status quo. Vote YES for real change, and then make it happen.