Using fiction as a lens through which to view particular
developments in the law, each of the essays in the new book, 'Law and the
Modern Condition: Literary and Historical Perspectives' (Talbot Publishing,
2013), discusses a work of literary fiction — some classical (the tale of Ruth
in the Bible, the fiction of Franz Kafka and Herman Melville, the plays of
William Shakespeare) some modern (the post-September 11 fiction of William
Gibson, Ken Kalfus, Claire Messud, Ian McEwan and Helen Schulman) — that
concerns, directly or indirectly, the historical development of the law. This exploration
of legal history through fiction pays particular attention to its relevance to
our present circumstances and our growing concerns about terrorism and civil
liberties. Each essay considers the legal lessons about the fictional event or
events at its core, lessons that tell us something worth remembering as we
continue to chart law’s evolution. These lessons, like those that may be found
in all great literature, necessarily extend beyond the historical confines of
the characters and plot and background of each story to embrace the modern
condition — which, as these great stories suggest, is and always has been the
only condition.
07 October 2013
ARTICLE: Friedman on Law and the Modern Condition
BOOK: Sankari on European Court of Justice Legal Reasoning in Context
The task of the European Court of Justice is to ensure that the law is
observed in interpreting and applying the Treaties. This duty is carried out in
a transnational constitutional environment where interpretation and application are to a large extent divorced from each other.
An array of approaches to assessing the Court’s work already exists. The
distinct underlying assumptions of each perspective affect how Court practice
is interpreted and evaluated. In terms of legal interpretation, at the one
extreme would be those who subscribe to a historical-originalist – or
conserving – approach and at the other those subscribing to an uncritically
teleological or dynamic approach premised on furthering integration. Neither extreme
necessarily reflects in either descriptive or normative terms a fair or
realistic understanding of the Court, its work, and the outcomes of legal
interpretation.
Even if in reality the differences were more a matter of
degree, developing a better balanced approach is useful.
The approach advocated here is called Court of
Justice legal reasoning. The approach is critical towards offering
generalisations concerning the Court’s work based on purposively chosen
case-law, downplaying the role of law in not only facilitating but also
restraining the Court’s choices, and overemphasising teleology or integration
as pre-designated and permanent explanatory factors of legal evolution. The
Court of Justice legal reasoning approach is firmly anchored to actual case-law
analysis, instead of abstract legal theory, which ensures it does not become
wholly disconnected from the everyday of courts. Moreover, the approach takes
into account how the Court keeps applying its relatively conventional
self-assumed criteria of legal interpretation, considers interpretations
offered in preliminary rulings in their systemic and factual context, and
generally views the Court as the constitutional court of a legal order. F
inally, the approach builds on sincerely listening to the Court: considering
the meaning of silences in reasoning, ways of restrictive interpretation, and
the distinction between singular cases and lines of cases in defining the
degree of universality of interpretations included in them. The aim is to
further the understanding of scholars and practitioners in terms of how legal
interpretations pronounced, especially in preliminary rulings, both have been
and could be interpreted by their legal audience.
BLOG: Custom Now (from the Legal History Blog)
From the Legal History Blog:
Custom Now: A Symposium
Posted by Dan Ernst
I've recently learned of an interesting symposium on custom published in volume 48 of the Texas International Law Journal, which is available on line:
Introduction, by Emily Kadens
In the Name of Custom, Culture, and the Constitution: Korean Customary Law in Flux, by Marie Seong-Hak Kim
Legal Autonomy Versus Regulatory Law: Customary Law in Eastern Scandinavia, by Kjell Å. Modéer
Western Scandinavia: Exit “Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch” — The Resurrection of Customary Laws, by Peter Ørebech
False Jurisdictions? A Revisionist Take on Customary (Religious) Law in Germany, by Pascale Fournier & Pascal McDougall
The Law and Economics of Norms, by Juliet P. Kostritsky
Custom in American Property Law: A Vanishing Act, by Henry E. Smith
The Jurisprudence of Custom, by Frederick Schauer
BOOKS: Political and Legal Transformations of an Indonesian Polity and Religion in Disputes
The Commission on Legal Pluralism has recently circulated the following:
RECENT PUBLICATIONS IN
LEGAL PLURALISM
1. Political and Legal
Transformations of an Indonesian Polity: The Nagari from Colonisation to
Decentralisation, by Franz von
Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Cambridge University
Press.
Political and Legal
Transformations of an Indonesian Polity is a long-term study of the historical
transformations of the Minangkabau polity of nagari, property relations and the
ever-changing dynamic relationships between Minangkabau matrilineal adat law,
Islamic law and state law. While the focus is on the period since the fall of
President Suharto in 1998, the book charts a long history of political and legal
transformations before and after Indonesia's independence, in which the
continuities are as notable as the changes. It also throws light on the
transnational processes through which legal and political ideas spread and
acquire new meanings. The multi-temporal historical approach adopted is also
relevant to the more general discussions of the relationship between
anthropology and history, the creation of customary law, identity construction,
and the anthropology of colonialism.
More information: www . cambridge . org/9781107038592.
2. Religion in Disputes: Pervasiveness of Religious Normativity in Disputing Processes, by Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Martin Ramstedt, and Bertram Turner (eds.), Palgrave McMillan.
Religion manifests itself in an array of disputes in different geographical context. Here, the contributors examine such questions through case studies from Europe, the United States, Israel, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. The conficts range from those involving religious authorities to disputes in non-religious contexts in which actors invoke religious rhethoric and repertoires in settings that at first sight have nothing to do with classical disputing processes. The analyses are grounded in extensive ethnographical and historiographical research and show how different dimensions of the religious may enter into, transform, affect and be affected by the course an outcome of dispute processes at different moments of their unfolding.
More information: www . palgrave . com.
JOURNAL: Speical Issue of the International Journal of Discrimination and the Law
International Journal of Discrimination and the Law
Special Thematic Issue: Reasonable accommodation of religious claims in workplaces? Basic tensions, socio-legal debates, and (quasi-)judicial decisions in six European countries
Guest editors: Katayoun Alidadi, Veit Bader and Floris Vermeulen
ARTICLE: Svensson on Norms in Law and Society
Måns Svensson's '
Norms in Law and Society: Towards a Definition of the Socio-Legal Concept of Norms', to be included in M Baier (ed), Social and Legal Norms. (2013), is not on SSRN:
In this paper, I have argued that the norm concept is central to Sociology of Law and could be held to be equally important as, say, the concept of attitude to Social Psychology. It will probably never be possible to fully bridge the classic gulf between the two dominating academic perspectives on Law – namely, Sociology and Legal Science. However, the norm concept, defined via the essential attributes, tells us that all norms (legal and other social norms) have three properties in common: they are imperatives (‘ought’), yet social facts (‘is’), and, in the end, always subjective beliefs.
JOURNAL: (2013) 16:3 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal
Oratio: Address to Commemorate the 2013 Martin Luther King Day at the Law Faculty, University of Michigan By K
Govender
Oratio: A Non-Lawyer's Views on the
Revised White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage of 2013 By M van
Graan
Chaos in Family Law: A Model for the Recognition of Intimate
Relationships in South Africa By P
Bakker
The Quest for a Supranational Entity in West Africa: Can the
Economic Community of West African States attain the
Status? By J
Lokulo-Sodipe & A Osuntogun
The Sexual Orientation of a Parent as a Factor when
Considering Care By C Feldhaus
& C van den Heeve
A Human Rights-Based Approach to Poverty Reduction: The Role
of the Right of Access to Medicine as an Element of the Right of Access to
Health Care By BZ Straus
& D Horsten
For previous issues of PER,
please go to http://www.nwu.ac.za/p-per/volumes.html
PER
publishes contributions in English, Afrikaans, Dutch and German and all
contributions are blindly peer reviewed.
Please send all contributions
electronically to the editor, Christa Rautenbach, at christa.rautenbach@nwu.ac.za.
The style requirements of PER can be found at http://www.nwu.ac.za/content/style.
Please
don’t hesitate to contact us by e-mail if you have any questions. We look
forward to hearing from you.
ARTICLE: Choudhury on Law, Gender, and the Burden of Culture
This essay makes three points about the use of culture as an argument against law reform and as an explanation for why reform does not happen. First, culture (and its religious analog) is often used as a justification for avoiding gender law reform. However, what is often hidden behind such usage is a highly particular and discreet set of political choice about how to arrange the rights and obligations within society. These choices are not determined a priori by a cultural script. Second, both those who tend to use it to justify doing nothing or doing very limited reforms as well as those who seek sweeping reforms view culture similarly. This mirroring of relativists and universalists is an old construction that has roots in the colonial period and this history is important in understand the present dilemmas of feminism. Finally, that mirroring dynamic also reflects a seemingly intractable oppositional tension between multi-culturalist/relativists who seek to preserve culture and the universalists who seek to overcome it. This tension is very present in legal feminist thought and activism making transnational coalitions and support more complicated. While it is impossible to fully explore that tension as it manifests in the literature or its damaging effects on feminist activism and agenda-setting, I do want to examine two contexts in which it can be clearly observed: the veil context in France and the recent activism by Femen to “free” Muslim women from Islam. By grounding the theoretical observations in these two practical phenomena, I hope to show that unless the impasse is overcome, the full potential of emancipatory feminist thought and activism will never be realized.
BOOK: Banakar and Tavers on Law and Social Theory
Edited by Reza Banakar and Max Travers
There is a growing interest within law
schools in the intersections between law and different areas of social theory.
The second edition of this popular text introduces a wide range of traditions in
sociology and the humanities that offer provocative, contextual views on law and
legal institutions.
The book is organised into six sections,
each with an introduction by the editors, on classical sociology of law, systems
theory, critical approaches, law in action, postmodernism, and law in global
society. Each chapter is written by a specialist who reviews the literature, and
discusses how the approach can be used in researching different topics. New
chapters include authoritative reviews of actor network theory, new legal
realism, critical race theory, post-colonial theories of law, and the sociology
of the legal profession. Over half the chapters are new, and the rest are
revised in order to include discussion of recent literature.
02 October 2013
OPINION: Fictions and Fecklessness (On the Proposed Abolition of the Upper House of Parliament in the Republic of Ireland)
NOTE: The following paper relates to the current debate in the Republic of Ireland about whether or not to abolish its upper house of parliament (the Seanad). I include it here both because I believe that it might be of interest to many of you and because the referendum occurs this Friday and I wanted to make the text available. This version is the latest of those I've delivered at public debates on the subject. My more extended treatment of the subject is available here and here. For more information on the referendum, see here. - SPD
FICTIONS AND FECKLESSNESS
Dr
Seán Patrick Donlan
I’m
not a party political man, but I’m a democrat to the bone. The Seanad is an
irredeemable institution and an insult to the principles of our republic. Its failings
include:
- Its thinly-disguised partisanship, under the fiction of vocationalism
- Its explicit elitism, including special representation for specific classes
- Its political cronyism, the power it provides for political patronage
- Its distant, attenuated democracy; this referendum is more genuinely democratic than any Seanad election
The
fact that the Seanad is also unnecessary and unfit for purpose is only more
damning.
For
a more egalitarian republic and a more direct democracy, the Seanad should be
abolished so that we can turn to more important matters, not least real reform
of the Dáil, our democratic chamber. But abolition is no mere sideshow and
serious parliamentary reform is dependent on sorting out its place in our
constitutional order.
In
short, the Seanad’s flaws are too fundamental to be fixed. We might tinker with
its vocationalism, elitism, or patronage, though few on the NO side are
committed to even these modest changes. But the Seanad is also redundant and
even anti-democratic. To meaningfully widen
its electorate would duplicate the Dáil’s popular mandate. The result could be
gridlock and conflict between the houses over which chamber actually represents
the people. And broadening the Seanad’s brief can only occur at the expense of
our democratic chamber. They’d hardly agree to this. Nor should they.
Along
with a majority of the people, both Government and opposition parties support abolition:
Fine Gael, Labour, Sinn Féin, and the Socialist Party. Not surprisingly, Fianna
Fáil, the coalition’s perennial opponent, opposes them. In fact, except for
Senators desperate to save their cushy seats, only other ghosts of Governments
past are allies (ie, the Green Party and the PDs). Indeed, it’s no coincidence
that those most sceptical of a more direct democracy, and of the Dáil itself, are
those most recently denied parliamentary power by the people. No wonder they
don’t trust them.
And,
to my deep disappointment, there are also well-meaning fellow progressives who
want to hold onto the Seanad to advance their politics without the hard and
messy work of real democracy. This odd alliance is at once patronising towards
the people and cynical in their campaign and condescending towards the people and
defeatist about our ability to govern without the minders of the Seanad. In
short, they don’t trust us or our democratic representatives.
In
the NO crowd’s campaign of misinformation, they’ve spared no effort in whipping
up paranoia about abolition, madly dashing everywhere to shout that ‘the sky is
falling, the sky is falling’.
I’m
not suggesting that the YES side is snowy white. It isn’t. The cost and number
of our parliamentarians, the public focus of the Government campaign, is
irrelevant. Our citizens would pay for good government. The coalition ought to
have done better and acted more honourably.
But
even today, the NO side has made vulgar comparisons between our Government and communism
and fascism, between our Taoiseach and Kim Jong-un or Mussolini. And ‘Democracy
Matters’, the leading group on the NO side, whose name is worthy of the
doublethink of George Orwell’s 1984, suggests
that a people’s free vote on the content of their Constitution is the
equivalent of trampling on that document. This isn’t to be taken seriously. The
amendment won’t bring constitutional crisis or autocracy or asteroids or plague
or the end of days. It’ll hardly be noticed.
For
example, the Seanad has never been a check on anyone. It was never meant to be
and it should not be. The President, the courts, and general elections are our
constitutional checks against legislative power. Most constitutional changes
related to the referendum are mere editing. The NO side’s scaremongering about
Articles 27 and 29 is spurious.
Similarly,
the belief that our whip system is too strong, and it is, has nothing to do
with the Seanad. The whip is a political, not a constitutional, matter. Insofar
as it can be changed, only Dáil reform is relevant. If anything, abolition will
remove a Taoiseach’s power to reward cronies with cushy jobs in Senate seats. And
there will be higher thresholds for impeachments of judges and the President. Those
are real, practical checks on the Government.
And
the Seanad is unnecessary. One house of parliament works well throughout the
world for states like ours. With minor alterations, unicameralism provides the
heightened scrutiny and deliberation in law-making that we desire. And it would
do so with a single mandate from the people through our genuinely democratic
general elections. There’d be no tug-of-war between chambers.
We
have bicameralism because the British did and because the Seanad once provided
a safe haven for southern unionists. Bicameralism is largely a holdover from a
feudal past. It isn’t made for democracy and in a modern state like ours, it
muddies the popular will, it doesn’t protect it. We have bicameralism only
because we’ve always had it. Its roots are
- pre-modern aristocracies and elitism,
- colonial copying around the world,
- inertia and fear of change, and, as here,
- ‘jobs for the boys’
Bicameralism
can make sense where it’s used to represent distinct territorial units or
cultural groups. But as a small, unitary republic, there’s no reason for it
here.
But
the biggest lie of the NO side is as much their self-deception as their con.
Not only is reform not on the ballot, but there has never been, and there is
not now, any consensus on reform. At least four different polls have confirmed this
in the last month, including one today. Those supporting reform make up 29% of
the population, only two points above the number of undecided in this
referendum; a mere 36% of those intending to vote. And those numbers have to be
divided between at least six reform schemes, the largest two of which are
fundamentally contradictory.
And
we should be very grateful because the NO side want to solve the real problems
of our republic with gimmicks and fantasy, even though that’s how we bungled
the creation of the Seanad back in the 1930s. This is exciting perhaps, but the
stuff of daydream and, with respect, the thought questions of undergraduate
exams. In addition, the best-known schemes of current Senators and their
patrician allies, still perpetuate the fiction of vocationalism, the elitism of
university set-asides, and political patronage. They’re barely reforms at all.
There most novel in their attempt to give special representation for special
interests, but this neo-vocationalism has succeeded nowhere.
Ironically,
the most radical scheme is that of Fianna Fáil itself, though no one is talking
about it. This is true because it’s unworkable and because it conflicts
fundamentally with the pet schemes of their own allies. But it hardly matters.
There’s no reform consensus and not a word of it will become law. And I say
this with optimism, the realism of a democrat who wants a more egalitarian
republic and a more direct democracy than any of the so-called reforms provide
for.
In
conclusion, the Seanad must be abolished. It’s elitist, undemocratic, and
wholly unnecessary. It shouldn’t be tolerated in a republic.
But
it’s important to remember that abolition takes effect after the next general
election. Government reforms already proposed, on Dáil committees and gender
quotas, have real practical, potential. But like others, I believe that more
can and should be done. It’ll be in the interest of the coalition, in the
aftermath of a YES result, to show itself to be serious about Dáil reform.
And
there’s so much potential for this, rooted not in speculative schemes, but in
established political science. I hope, in future, to work alongside those who
are now my opponents in this debate, to ensure meaningful Dáil reform. To hold
the coalition’s feet to the fire. And if this coalition, or future Governments
of any political persuasion, fails to deliver, we can always dump them, as we
did, belatedly perhaps, with the last Government. That’s as it should be.
That’s the ‘terrible beauty’ of democracy.
Our
republic doesn’t need Seanad minders, but a
more active and engaged citizenry. We need a more direct, unicameral
democracy—not buck-passing bicameralism—to pressure our public representatives
to do our bidding. Oversight of our politicians is our responsibility as
citizens. And, unlike the NO side, I have faith that the Irish people can do
this.
Don’t
be conned. A NO result is a vote for the status quo. Vote YES for real change,
and then make it happen.
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