Abstract
This timely
volume by distinguished scholar Günter Frankenberg offers a sophisticated
analysis and sharp critique of the reactions of nations such as the US, Great
Britain and Germany to perceived terrorist threats, organized crime actions and
other political emergencies that have occurred in recent years.
The author
demonstrates how governments have increasingly sacrificed the rule of law and
human rights for the benefit of security programs – as evidenced by a rise in
extraordinary measures such as surveillance, detention and torture – thus
normalizing the state of exception and privileging preemptive, proactive and
coercive methods of political engineering. An interdisciplinary and
multi-jurisdictional study, this book develops and implements a unique
theoretical and conceptual framework for understanding the rise of
technical-political rationality and the fall of the rule of law, and submits
both to a firm critique.
Particularly
relevant in light of current controversies, this provocative book will appeal
to scholars and students of international and constitutional law, legal theory,
political science, and terrorism studies.
On the book
‘Books
abound on the question whether states of emergency can be legally controlled.
But Frankenberg’s account stands out because of his mastery of the political
and legal contexts in which the terms of the debate about states of emergency
were framed for us – the situation of Weimar and the constitutional reaction in
postwar Germany. In addition, Frankenberg has an astonishing command of the
history of political theory from Hobbes to the present. His innovative but
scholarly analyses permit him to construct a narrative about the potential of
the rule of law to respond to emergencies that includes detailed examinations
of Schmitt, Foucault, Habermas, Agamben, and many others. His treatments of
these figures seek to draw out the genuine insights they might offer, so that,
even though none of the figures escapes the force of his criticism, his
argument will challenge the assumptions of all involved in the debate.’
– David
Dyzenhaus, University of Toronto, Canada