The 2013 UK IVR Annual Conference - Legal Theory and Legal History: A Neglected Dialogue? – will be held from 12-13 April
2013 in the Law Building of Queen Mary, University
of London. The IVR is the International Association of Legal and Social Philosophy.
An extensive and exciting programme has been prepared and the conference description reads:
The 2013 annual conference of the UK
Branch of the IVR is designed to bring together legal theorists and legal
historians (including historians of legal theory and political thought) in an
attempt to facilitate and encourage dialogue between the two disciplines.
Apart from some notable exceptions,
much of contemporary legal theory is uninformed by history, including legal
history. This is deeply regrettable, for legal theories may be vastly improved
by being informed, and perhaps more importantly, challenged by historical
contexts. Theories of law, one might say, are better if they are forged at the
coal-face of historical research. Similarly, one could argue that legal
histories are better when they draw on, and themselves contribute to, the
conceptual resources of legal theory.
Somewhat more radically, if one agrees law does not have a nature, but a culture, then one must account for how the culture of law changes, and has changed, over time. This, by necessity, demands a historically-informed methodology. Similarly, the problem of change is an unavoidable one in legal theory, whether that be change in legal regimes or changes in certain areas of the law – here, again, the resources of history, including the philosophy of history, are invaluable. Putting things a little more colourfully, one could say that legal ideas cannot but be understood historically.
Further, legal theory has, of course, its own history: legal theories are not disconnected islands, but rather interventions in a long series of dialogues and polylogues amongst theorists. As many have observed, and described, legal theory’s history needs to be informed not only by such dialogues and polylogues amongst theorists, but also by awareness of the theorist’s immersion in political, economic and other conditions of his or her time and place – there, once more, a serious engagement with history is important.
Somewhat more radically, if one agrees law does not have a nature, but a culture, then one must account for how the culture of law changes, and has changed, over time. This, by necessity, demands a historically-informed methodology. Similarly, the problem of change is an unavoidable one in legal theory, whether that be change in legal regimes or changes in certain areas of the law – here, again, the resources of history, including the philosophy of history, are invaluable. Putting things a little more colourfully, one could say that legal ideas cannot but be understood historically.
Further, legal theory has, of course, its own history: legal theories are not disconnected islands, but rather interventions in a long series of dialogues and polylogues amongst theorists. As many have observed, and described, legal theory’s history needs to be informed not only by such dialogues and polylogues amongst theorists, but also by awareness of the theorist’s immersion in political, economic and other conditions of his or her time and place – there, once more, a serious engagement with history is important.
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