"Constitution-Making in Egypt: The Role of Constitutional Court Judges"
in Revolution as a Process: The Case of the Egyptian Uprising edited by Adham Hamed (Wiener Verlag für Sozialforschung (6 Dec 2014)
in Revolution as a Process: The Case of the Egyptian Uprising edited by Adham Hamed (Wiener Verlag für Sozialforschung (6 Dec 2014)
Since February 2011, when street protests forced former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to resign, Egypt has experienced two constitution drafting processes. This chapter examines the role of judges in the second constitution-making process.
More specifically, it examines and interrogates the role of individual Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) judges. It begins with an introduction to constitution-making and constitutional courts, and then points to an important literature gap at the intersection of these two subjects. Following this, it examines the situation in Egypt. There is a brief description of the Egyptian SCC and the role of SCC judges in the constitution-making process leading up to the 2014 Constitution. Finally, it offers some analysis and observations, employing democratic concepts and principles about the role of judges in a democracy, all with a commitment to liberal constitutionalism.
Ultimately, the author raises a number of abstract and Egypt-specific contextualized factors to assess the role of judges in constitution-making, in order to begin a discussion about the kinds of considerations that might be made generally in constitution-making. The key conclusion is that while there may be value to having judges formally involved in constitution building, much is at risk for judicial independence in the process.
More specifically, it examines and interrogates the role of individual Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) judges. It begins with an introduction to constitution-making and constitutional courts, and then points to an important literature gap at the intersection of these two subjects. Following this, it examines the situation in Egypt. There is a brief description of the Egyptian SCC and the role of SCC judges in the constitution-making process leading up to the 2014 Constitution. Finally, it offers some analysis and observations, employing democratic concepts and principles about the role of judges in a democracy, all with a commitment to liberal constitutionalism.
Ultimately, the author raises a number of abstract and Egypt-specific contextualized factors to assess the role of judges in constitution-making, in order to begin a discussion about the kinds of considerations that might be made generally in constitution-making. The key conclusion is that while there may be value to having judges formally involved in constitution building, much is at risk for judicial independence in the process.
"Boko Haram, Islamic Law of Rebellion and the ICC"
International Human Rights Law Review 3 (2014) 29-60
International Human Rights Law Review 3 (2014) 29-60
NOELLE HIGGINS, Maynooth University
Email: nfhiggins@gmail.com
DR. MOHAMED ELEWA BADAR, University of Northumbria - School of Law
Email: Mohamed.badar@northumbria.ac.uk
Email: nfhiggins@gmail.com
DR. MOHAMED ELEWA BADAR, University of Northumbria - School of Law
Email: Mohamed.badar@northumbria.ac.uk
Since its foundation in 1999 Boko Haram has carried out numerous acts of violence on the territory of Nigeria constituting gross violations of human rights. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been monitoring the violence between Boko Haram and Nigerian armed forces as part of a preliminary investigation. It has stated that the violence between Boko Haram and the armed forces has reached the level of a non-international armed conflict and that there is reason to believe that Boko Haram is responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. This article assesses certain types of behaviour of Boko Haram from an Islamic law perspective and examines whether Islamic law condemns or justifies such acts. Arguably, it would help the ICC in asserting the legitimacy of its judgments, if it was able to prove that such judgments are compatible with the legal and belief system recognised by the actors at trial. In turn it would enable the Court to deal with at least some of the criticisms aimed at it for being an imperialistic institution.
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