"Juries, Social Norms, and Civil Justice"
Alabama Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 5, 2014
William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-282
Alabama Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 5, 2014
William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-282
At the root of many contemporary debates and landmark cases in the civil justice system are underlying questions about the role of the civil jury. In prior work, I examined the justifications for the civil jury as a political institution, and found them wanting in our contemporary legal system.
This Article looks closely and critically at the justification for the civil jury as an adjudicative institution and questions the conventional wisdom behind it. The focus is on tort law because the jury has more power to decide questions of law in tort than any other area of law. The Article makes three original contributions.
First, I undermine the claim that the breach question in negligence is inevitably one for the jury by revisiting a famous debate between Cardozo and Holmes about the possibility of judge-made rules around breach in tort. Second, I draw on social and cognitive psychology to question the conventional wisdom that juries applying general standards are ideally suited to identify and apply social norms. And third, I sketch a middle-ground approach on breach, which involves presumptive rules that defer to indicia of social norms such as statutes and regulations, custom, and the market.
This Article looks closely and critically at the justification for the civil jury as an adjudicative institution and questions the conventional wisdom behind it. The focus is on tort law because the jury has more power to decide questions of law in tort than any other area of law. The Article makes three original contributions.
First, I undermine the claim that the breach question in negligence is inevitably one for the jury by revisiting a famous debate between Cardozo and Holmes about the possibility of judge-made rules around breach in tort. Second, I draw on social and cognitive psychology to question the conventional wisdom that juries applying general standards are ideally suited to identify and apply social norms. And third, I sketch a middle-ground approach on breach, which involves presumptive rules that defer to indicia of social norms such as statutes and regulations, custom, and the market.
"Human Rights Through the ATS after Kiobel: Partial Extraterritoriality, Misconceptions, and Elusive and Problematic Judicially-Created Criteria"
6 Duke Forum for Law & Social Change 31 (2014)
U of Houston Law Center No. 2014-A-75
6 Duke Forum for Law & Social Change 31 (2014)
U of Houston Law Center No. 2014-A-75
The evident split in Kiobel has, in the words of Justice Kennedy, left open a number of significant questions regarding proper elaboration and explanation of the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort Statute. Among these are whether a presumption against extraterritoriality should apply and, if it is used, whether inconsistent and ambiguous criteria are preferable in deciding when it is displaced. Extraterritoriality of some sort has been affirmed, but there is an evident lack of consensus on rationales, doctrines, and criteria.
For this reason, its is important to reconsider what the full set of early cases and opinions of Attorneys General add for proper decisionmaking regarding the statute’s evident reach; what is compelled by adequate awareness of the nature of the law that is expressly incorporated by reference and its jurisdictional attributes and substantive grasp; how congressional endorsement of the Filartiga line of cases should displace a judicially-created presumption as well as supposed “foreign relations” concerns and provide needed guidance; how the Charming Betsy rule supplements the need to interpret the statute consistently with universal jurisdiction and responsibility as well as human rights of access to courts and to an effective remedy under international law; and how the rationale in the Bowman exception to a presumption of non-extraterritoriality supports that requirement. This article provides a basis for such an inquiry. Part III identifies evident misconceptions in some of the opinions and is organized into eight areas.
For this reason, its is important to reconsider what the full set of early cases and opinions of Attorneys General add for proper decisionmaking regarding the statute’s evident reach; what is compelled by adequate awareness of the nature of the law that is expressly incorporated by reference and its jurisdictional attributes and substantive grasp; how congressional endorsement of the Filartiga line of cases should displace a judicially-created presumption as well as supposed “foreign relations” concerns and provide needed guidance; how the Charming Betsy rule supplements the need to interpret the statute consistently with universal jurisdiction and responsibility as well as human rights of access to courts and to an effective remedy under international law; and how the rationale in the Bowman exception to a presumption of non-extraterritoriality supports that requirement. This article provides a basis for such an inquiry. Part III identifies evident misconceptions in some of the opinions and is organized into eight areas.
"War for the Wrong Reasons: Lessons from Law"
11 Journal of Moral Philosophy 454 (2014)
11 Journal of Moral Philosophy 454 (2014)
GABRIELLA BLUM, Harvard Law School
Email: gblum@law.harvard.edu
JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, Harvard Law School
Email: jgoldberg@law.harvard.edu
Email: gblum@law.harvard.edu
JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, Harvard Law School
Email: jgoldberg@law.harvard.edu
In Ethics for Enemies, Frances Kamm argues that, under certain conditions, it is morally permissible for a state to launch a war for opportunistic reasons. We consider how law might shed light on Kamm’s argument. Part I addresses the application of criminal and tort law to individual acts of violence analogous to the acts of war analyzed by Kamm. It primarily argues that these bodies of law rely on a framework for determining legal permissibility that runs counter to, and perhaps demonstrates weaknesses in, Kamm’s framework for assessing moral permissibility. Part II considers the law of war. It maintains that, although modern law permits certain opportunistic acts of war, the law does so on terms that cut against Kamm’s claim as to their moral permissibility.
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