11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 801-808 (2013) has published Paul Schiff Berman’s, ‘How Legal Pluralism Is and Is Not Distinct from Liberalism: A Response to Dennis Patterson and Alexis Galán’.
Abstract
Alexis Galan and Dennis Patterson largely
accept the descriptive account of plural authority described in my book, Global
Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders. However, they are
concerned that my normative argument for procedural mechanisms, institutional
designs, and discursive practices for managing pluralism is simply liberalism
in another guise and not pluralist enough. Given that pluralists are usually
criticized from the opposite side for an approach that results in too much
fragmentation and destabilization, I am in some sense happy to welcome this new
critique. After all, a position cannot easily be simultaneously too radical and
not radical enough. Nevertheless, while there is clearly a liberal bias at its
core, I don't think it's true that the pluralist vision I espouse is solely
liberalism in disguise. Accordingly, in this brief response, I sketch out ways
in which the proceduralist pluralism I advocate, while it is not necessarily
incompatible with liberalism, at least shifts the emphasis to a set of values
that are not always fully captured in the design of liberal procedures and
institutions.
The article is available here.
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