Additional articles from SSRN have been noted by our friend in
the Irish
Society of Comparative Law:
·
Giesen, Ivo, The Use and Influence of Comparative Law in ‘Wrongful Life’
Cases (May 10, 2012). Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 35-54, May
2012.
In analysing 'wrongful life' cases, comparative law is used
extensively. This article examines these wrongful life cases, especially in
light of the contradicting outcomes in different jurisdictions across the
world, with the Dutch Kelly case and the South African decision in Stewart v
Botha as its main examples. I will test the hypothesis that it is not so much
the outcomes and (more importantly) the arguments found elsewhere through the
comparative law method that are decisive in highly debated cases like those
concerning wrongful life, but that instead it is something else that decides
the issue, something I would define as the cultural background of, or the legal
policies within a tort law system.
·
Kuo, Ming-Sung, From Administrative Law to Administrative Legitimation? The
Spatiality of Law and Transnational Administrative Law in Comparative
Perspective (2012). International & Comparative Law Quarterly,
Forthcoming ; Warwick School of Law Research Paper No. 2012/12.
Globalisation redefines the relationship between law and space,
resulting in the emergence of transnational administrative law in a globalising
legal space. I aim to shed light on transnational administrative law by
examining how administrative law relates to the process of European
integration. I argue that the idea of administrative legitimation is at the
core of this relationship. In the European Union, transnational administration
grounds its legitimacy on the fulfilment of administrative law requirements.
However, given that in the European Union, administrative legitimation is rooted
in Europe’s constitutional transformation, I caution against the projection of
Europe’s experience onto global governance.
·
Emmert, Frank, Stare Decisis - A Universally Misunderstood Idea? (May 7,
2012).
In this article, I argue against the overstatement of the binding
effects of precedent in common law and against the understatement of the
relevance of precedent in civil law. I try to show that judges and courts in
both kind of systems have to acknowledge relevant precedents and then provide
persuasive reasons for following or not following them. Blindly following
precedent, just as blind application of statutes, is acceptable only in the
'empire of mechanical jurisprudence'. Ignoring precedent in the name of
judicial independence, on the other hand, is acceptable only in the empire of
arbitrary jurisprudence. Legal systems subscribing to the rule of law can
neither be mechanical nor arbitrary. They have to care about legitimacy of the
judicial process. They have to explain themselves and they have to do so
persuasively.
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